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4.1 introduction
Ask anyone in the antitrust community the question, “Is there an intersection
between contemporary antitrust enforcement and legal training?” and the
answer would be, “Yes.” Ask any of the same people, “Is there a connection
between contemporary antitrust enforcement and the discipline of econom-
ics?” and the answer still would be, “Yes.” But to the question, “Is there a
relationship between Christianity and contemporary antitrust enforcement?”
the response is likely an “I don’t think so,” or, just as likely, a blank stare.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the Christian faith has a
nexus with the institution of antitrust. It turns out it doesn’t – and it does. For
example, Christianity cannot explain why the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is
superior to the four-firm concentration ratio as a measure of industry concen-
tration. Economics can. On the other hand, economics cannot explain why
the per se rule against price-fixing is morally appropriate.1 The Bible can.
In this chapter, we develop a triad of noteworthy connections between the
institution of antitrust and the Christian faith.2 First, we explore the historical
connection between the institution of antitrust and Christianity.
Understanding this link between Christianity and antitrust involves an exercise
The authors thank John Bigelow, Sarah Estelle, P. J. Hill, John Lunn, Edd Noell, Daniel Sokol,
and Andrew Yuengert for comments and Charles Smith for excellent research assistance.
1 Economics, as a science, can explain only the consequences for consumers and producers of a
market’s cartelization.
2 While 3 is a special integer in the Christian faith, we don’t contend there is anything inspired
by this number of connections. Three is the number of the Trinity, the three persons of the
Christian godhead (Matthew 28:19; John 14:26). It also is the number of strands in a cord that
the Bible contends is not easily broken or severed (Ecclesiastes 4:22). The Bible also records
that Jesus’ resurrection took place on the third day (Luke 9:22; Luke 24:5–6; Luke 24:7;
Luke 24:46).
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in intellectual history. Many notable Christian thinkers, from the Catholic
Aquinas to the Reformers Luther and Calvin, weighed in on such topics as
markets, economic competition, and monopoly. But one person’s influence,
which we characterize as Christian, played a uniquely formative role in the
development of modern antitrust policy – Adam Smith’s. If antitrust had an
economist patron saint, it would be Adam Smith. Smith’s advocacy of the free
market’s capabilities revealed the importance of maintaining competition in
markets. Because economics has made such inroads into antitrust, any link
between Adam Smith and the Christian faith reveals a connection between
antitrust and Christianity.
Second, we explore a Christian perspective on some of the major themes in
antitrust, such as the meaning of rationality and efficiency, the morality of
competition, and the importance of innovation. For example, when antitrust
models human beings as either buyers or sellers, they are assumed to be
rational. In the world of antitrust, the economic agents on the demand side
and the supply side of the marketplace compare the price of a good or service
(e.g., the value of opportunities foregone) with the benefits (in terms of utility
derived from consumption). The decision calculus for buying or selling is
based on weighing the costs and benefits inherent in such a choice. Poets,
Romantics, Impulse Buyers, Hoarders, Don’t-Give-a-Tinker’s-Damn Type
People, and the Deranged are never actors on the antitrust stage. Only rational
actors need apply. In this second portion of our chapter, we explore what it
means for antitrust to be based on rationality and we contend that there is a
relationship between the rationality of man and the rationality of God, as both
man and God are understood and portrayed in Christian theology.
Similarly, we explore how the purported goal of antitrust to promote
economic efficiency may, in terms of Christian theology, be connected to
good stewardship. The Bible, including several teachings of Jesus, contains
many references to the concept of stewardship. Men and women, the only
ones in creation who bear God’s image, are to be good stewards over God’s
creation. A steward doesn’t manage his or her own assets but rather is entrusted
with the property or finances of someone else. While an owner can use their
resources any way they want, a steward knows the day will come when his or
her employer asks to examine the books. The Christian Scriptures draw this
same parallel: humans act as stewards over all “God’s good earth” – with a day
of reckoning to come. The Bible also teaches the importance of equity, for we
learn in the Scriptures that the Lord will judge with equity.3 So it is important
3 Psalm 75:2.
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to understand the connection between the institution of antitrust, efficiency,
and equity.
The morality of competition as opposed to cooperation is another important
theme at the intersection of antitrust and Christianity. Is it ethical for
Christian business people to outcompete their commercial rivals? Or does
loving one’s neighbor as oneself require cooperating rather than increasing
one’s market share at a rival’s expense? Can economic competition be justified
on the grounds that, like athletic competition, it brings out the best in
everyone?
Another theme intersecting antitrust and Christian doctrine is the role of
innovation. While faulty narratives often portray Christianity as antagonistic to
innovation, both Christian theology and Church history have been supportive
of innovation. From God’s mandate to Adam to “be fruitful and multiply and
fill the earth and subdue it” in Genesis 1:28 throughout the biblical narrative,
Christian doctrine squares with innovative methodologies to improve life and
well-being. History chronicles the connection between the spread of
Christianity and innovation. The institution of antitrust promotes competitive
processes that have often enabled and incentivized innovation. Thus, as
antitrust “subdues the earth” through providing a competitive framework with
incentives to innovate, it is linked to Christianity’s promotion of innovation.
In the third section of this chapter, drawing on the historical precedents and
our analysis of antitrust’s major themes, we examine a few legal domains of
antitrust law. Our focus is on price-fixing. If antitrust were a meal, price-fixing
would be the main course, and all the other business practices influenced by
antitrust would be the soup, salad, or dessert courses. Every antitrust compli-
ance program starts with warnings about price-fixing. Every antitrust practi-
tioner knows that antitrust takes a dim view of price-fixing. We explore why
the Christian faith underscores that view. We also offer some observations on
mergers and monopolization.
4.2 a brief intellectual history of christianity
and economic competition
4.2.1 Medieval and Reformation Thought on Usury and Monopoly
Although it is customary to think of antitrust law as an artifact of American
reaction to late nineteenth-century industrialization, there is a long tradition
of intellectual thought and legal regard to the question of monopoly and
competition. Influential church leaders have addressed such questions, dir-
ectly or indirectly, for centuries.
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Competition policy has roots in early Christianity, with edicts by Christian
emperors prohibiting such market abuses as monopolies and cartels.4 But it
was not until the Middle Ages that Christian scholars began to work out
general legal, ethical, and economic theories of economic competition. The
medieval scholastics conceptualized such questions under the heading of
“usury” and “just price theory.”5 Thomas Aquinas asserted that anyone pursu-
ing an excessive profit to the detriment of the public is a dishonest trader.6
Under canon law, monopoly profits were considered ill-gotten gains subject to
claims for restitution.7 Monopoly pricing was considered a deviation from just
pricing, a transgression against principles of brotherly love and charity, and
injurious to the community. Many writers in the Scholastic tradition, includ-
ing Nicole Oresme (c. 1320–1382), San Antonio, Archbishop of Florence
(1389–1459), and San Bernardino of Siena (1380–1444), wrote strongly against
monopolies, either private or state-granted, and price-fixing cartels.8 Although
allowing that goods generally did not have an objective value and that
interplay between supply and demand was necessary to determine the just
price, medieval rules across Europe imposed extensive price controls in an
effort to balance the interests of producers and consumers.9
By the time of the Reformation, an antimonopoly tradition had firmly
taken root in the Christian mind.10 Martin Luther, influenced by the
Scholastic tradition in economic matters, lumped cartels and monopolies
under the wider rubric of “usury” and the “lust for profits,” by which he
meant charging more than a fair price. Luther saw a rising moral problem in
sixteenth-century Protestant Germany and identified cornering markets, or
what the British common law called forestalling, regrating, or engrossing, as
a particular problem:
Again, there are some who buy up the entire supply of certain goods or wares
in a country or a city, so that they may have those goods solely in their own
power and can then fix and raise the price and sell them as dear as they like or
4 W. W. Thornton, A Treatise on Combinations in Restraint of Trade, § 20 (2d ed. 1928).
5 See generally Marcia L. Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition
400–1400 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 330–334.
6 Raymond De Roover, “Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A Revision,”Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 65, no. 4 (1951), pp. 492–524.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 498–499.
9 Colish, Medieval Foundations.
10 For a non-Reformation analysis of the relationship between antitrust and Christianity, see
Tihamer Toth, “Is There a Vatican School for Competition Policy?,” Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal, vol. 46, no. 3 (2015), pp. 583–616.
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can. Now I have said above that the rule that a man may sell his goods as dear
as he will or can is false and unchristian. It is far more abominable that one
should buy up the whole commodity for that purpose. Even the imperial and
temporal laws forbid this and call it “monopoly,” i.e., purchase for self-
interest, which is not to be tolerated in city or country, and princes and lords
would stop it and punish it if they did their duty. Merchants who do this act
just as though God’s creatures and God’s goods were made for them alone
and given to them alone, and as though they could take them from other
people and set on them whatever price they chose.11
Luther contrasted monopolistic market-cornering with the Genesis 47
account of Joseph buying up grain for storage during the seven fat years in
anticipation of the coming seven lean years. This was not monopolistic,
according to Luther, but rather a “common and honest purchase” because
Joseph didn’t prevent anyone else from buying and Joseph was motivated,
through God’s wisdom, by the public good rather than personal gain. Because
antitrust economics does not distinguish whether monopoly profits are used for
personal gain or personal philanthropy (the resource misallocation being the
same), Luther’s exegesis would not persuademost antitrust practitioners. Joseph’s
buying the grain in the seven fat years appears to the economist to be a voluntary
market transaction. Likewise, when he sold the grain during the seven lean years,
Joseph seems to the economist to have acted very much as a monopolist, forcing
the Egyptians to give up everything they owned to Pharaoh.12
Luther also railed against predatory pricing:
When some see that they cannot establish their monopolies in any other way
because other people have the same goods, they proceed to sell their goods so
cheap that the others can make no profit, and thus they compel them either
not to sell at all, or else to sell as cheap as they themselves are selling and so
be ruined. Thus they get their monopoly after all. These people are not
worthy to be called men or to live among other men, nay they are not worth
exhorting or instructing; for their envy and greed is so open and shameless
that even at the cost of their own losses they cause loss to others, so that they
may have the whole place to themselves. The authorities would do right if
they took from such people everything they had and drove them out of the
country. It would scarcely have been necessary to tell of such doings, but
I wanted to include them so that it might be seen what great knavery there is
11 Martin Luther, “On Trading and Usury,” in Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia, PA:
A. J. Holman Company, 1915), pp. 26–27.
12 In addition to monopolies, Luther singled out price-fixing cartels as pernicious, and even
described an issue of considerable interest to modern economics: mechanisms by which
cartelists enforce their agreement internally and penalize “cheating.” Ibid., p. 30.
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in trade, and that it might be plain to everybody how things are going in the
world, in order that everyone may know how to protect himself against such a
dangerous class.13
Luther did not offer an opinion about how often business firms might
operate at the “cost of their own losses” and under what conditions pricing
below cost could become profitable. Contemporary antitrust scholarship has
since examined this question in detail. While predatory pricing is actionable
under the Sherman Act, antitrust now offers a cautionary perspective as to
the likelihood of predatory pricing as a plausible monopolizing strategy.14 The
most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court have followed in the
grain of the academic scholarship on predatory pricing.15
Max Weber famously anointed John Calvin the father of modern capitalism
due to the Protestant work ethic, but Calvin also was important to post-
Reformation economics by breaking with Luther and the medieval tradition
on usury. Calvin argued that Scripture did not condemn all lending for
interest, but only unscrupulous lending to the poor, loans that benefited only
the lender, and lending at excessive rates.16 While Calvin did not deal as
explicitly as Luther with monopolies and cartels, to the extent that the
medieval Christian conception of monopoly was bound up in the conception
13 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
14 The taproot of this antitrust scholarship on this subject is John McGee, “Predatory Pricing: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case,” Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 1 (October 1958), pp. 137–169 and
“Predatory Pricing Revisited,” Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 23 (October 1980),
pp. 289–230. For a summary of the issues, see Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael
Riordan, “Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy,” Georgetown Law Journal, vol.
88, no. 1 (August 2000), pp. 2239–2330; and Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills, “Predatory
Pricing and Strategic Theory,” Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 89 (August 2001), pp. 2475–2494.
15 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Here Justice Powell
concluded, “There is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Matsushita at p. 589. The Court’s skepticism
about the efficacy of predatory pricing continued in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown &Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). This case is often referred to as Brooke Group because the
Brooke Group acquired Liggett in the course of the litigation. In more recent cases, like Pacific
Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) and Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007), the Supreme Court has
continued to hold to a skeptical view of predatory pricing cases. However, some lower courts
have begun to cite a “post-Chicago” literature that views predatory pricing as a greater threat,
even though these cases have still tended to reject predatory pricing liability on the facts before
them. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (observing that, in light
of Post-Chicago scholarship, the court would not approach predatory pricing claims “with the
incredulity that once prevailed”).
16 Kathryn D. Blanchard, The Protestant Ethic or the Spirit of Capitalism (Eugene, OR: Cascade
Books, 2010), pp. 36–40; John Calvin, Letter of Advice on Usury (1545).
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of usury, Calvin freed Christian thought to deal with economic matters – and
the role of capital and investment in particular – in a more open light. In so
doing, he set the stage for the most important Christian writer of all time on
economics – Adam Smith.
4.2.2 Adam Smith and His Immediate Influences
Conventional wisdom identifies Adam Smith as the father of modern eco-
nomics.17 Because antitrust is now joined at the hip with economics, it is
worth revisiting the theological roots of Smith’s economic contribution.
While the intellectual and amicable connection between Smith and David
Hume (no friend of the Christian faith) is well known,18 and while most
scholars consider Smith to have been a deist, Smith’s intellectual debt to
Presbyterian clergy is less commonly acknowledged.19 Hence it is fitting to be
reminded of what Smith wrote about this group:
There is scarce perhaps to be found anywhere in Europe a more learned,
decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the
Presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.20
These men were scholar-pastors who were deeply affected by the Protestant
Reformation.21 While Smith is commonly thought to have made an economic
case for free markets and voluntary exchange, the Reformers who influenced
Smith were making a theological case for free markets and voluntary
exchange.
17 Economists often remark, “It’s all in Smith,”meaning that the substantive issues and principles
of economics have their taproot in The Wealth of Nations. A variation of this among
economists is that “It’s all in Marshall,” referring to Alfred Marshall’s magnum opus, Principles
of Economics. Marshall’s Principles was first published in 1890, the year antitrust was established
as a national policy in the United States with the passage of the Sherman Act.
18 David Hume, The Life of David Hume, Esq: Written by Himself. To Which Is Added, a Letter
from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, Esq. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library,
2007), originally published in Dublin, 1777. The latest scholarship regarding Smith and
Hume’s friendship is Dennis C. Rasmussen, The Infidel and the Professor (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017).
19 We are indebted to Samuel Gregg’s scholarship in this regard. See Samuel Gregg,
“Commercial Order and the Scottish Enlightenment: The Christian Context,” in Christian
Theology and Market Economics, eds. Ian R. Harper and Samuel Gregg (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2008), pp. 43–59.
20 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, ed. Edwin
Cannan (London: Methuen, 1904), p. 295.
21 Countries such as France, Spain, and Italy, where the Reformation did not advance, are absent
from Smith’s list. Notably, Germany, the home of Martin Luther, also is absent.
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Smith was a student of Francis Hutcheson, who was both a minister in the
Church of Scotland and a professor at Glasgow. Hutcheson was influenced by
Gershom Carmichael, a Presbyterian minister and a professor at St. Andrews
and Glasgow. Carmichael was himself influenced by the natural law teach-
ings of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. If one were writing in the
vernacular of the King James Version, Grotius and Pufendorf begat
Carmichael, Carmichael begat Hutcheson, Hutcheson begat Smith, and
Smith described the workings of what he called the “simple and obvious
system of natural liberty.”22 In what follows, we describe the “begats.” (Note:
See Chapter 10 for an analysis of Smith, Pufendorf, and Hutcheson’s views on
price controls.)
Smith’s work organized an economic way of thinking in an important – and
now iconic – fashion. But some of his important principles had already been
developed by “the Presbyterian clergy.” For example, one of the most famous
principles of economics, featured prominently in Smith, is that specialization
and division of labor generate economic growth. Smith encountered this
principle as a student of Hutcheson.23 Hutcheson, the clergyman-professor,
described “demand and supply” with as much clarity as Smith, his student:
We shall find that the prices of goods depend on these two jointly, the
demand on account of some use or other which many desire, and the
difficulty of acquiring, or cultivating for human use.24
What is important for our analysis is not that Hutcheson, a professor of moral
philosophy, was teaching economic principles before Smith was writing them
down. Rather, for Hutcheson, economics as a discipline formed and gener-
ated these principles from a moral foundation. Market processes worked best
not when people were driven by greed, but when they were motivated by
biblical virtues of saving and diligent labor. Smith heard these (literally)
“Proverbial” virtues taught by his teacher Hutcheson.25 Smith’s principle of
self-interest was expressed famously with his words,
22 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature, p. 184.
23 “Nay tis’ well known that the produce of the labours of any given number, twenty, for instance,
in providing the necessaries or conveniences of life, shall be much great by assigning to one, a
certain sort of work of one kind, in which he will soon acquire skill and dexterity, and to
another assigning work of a different kind, than if each one of the twenty were obliged to
employ himself, by turns, in all the different sorts of labour requisite for his subsistence, without
sufficient dexterity in any.” Frances Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, In Three Books
(Glasgow, 1755).
24 Ibid., p. 54.
25 Proverbs 6:6–8; Proverbs 21:5; Proverbs 21:20.
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It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we
expect our dinner, but from regard to their own interest. We address our-
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
our own necessities but of their advantages.26
Smith never uses the word greed as the motivator of buying and selling.
Smith’s principle of self-interest finds its roots in his contention that, “In
civilized society, [man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and
assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain
the friendship of a few persons.”27 It is this need for interaction between the
buyer and seller of goods in which Love, the chief of Christian virtues,
involves itself in the market economy.
Smith recognized the need for and presence of the virtue of Love in a
market economy. Writing in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he declared,
“Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved. It is not in being rich
that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and believed,
recompenses which those virtues must almost always acquire.”28 On this very
idea of “being trusted and believed” most market interactions depend.29
Drawing from Hutcheson’s ideas regarding the virtues of man, Smith
recognized that the duties of man and God in extending benevolence differ
practically. Smith observed that the notion that humans could manufacture
“the general happiness of mankind” would require that people do something
beyond their capabilities, but precisely in the abilities and desire of God.30
The administration of the great system of the universe . . . the care of the
universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God,
and not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one
much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of
his comprehension – the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his
friends, his country.31
26 Smith, Inquiry into the Nature, p. 16.
27 Ibid.
28 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Dover Philosophical Classics (New York:
Dover, 2006), p. 161.
29 There is, in fact, a branch of economic theory that explicitly pertains to “being trusted and
believed.” The literature regarding incentive compatibility in the context of asymmetric
information explains how individuals reveal their truthful incentives in a market transaction
only under certain rules that provide motivation to do so. Incentive compatible allocations that
might yield Pareto efficient allocations are those for which the holders of private information
will be willing to reveal it. See John O. Ledyard, “Incentive Compatibility,” in Allocation,
Information, and Markets (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), pp. 141–151.
30 Ronald Coase, “Adam Smith’s View ofMan,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 19 (1976), p. 17.
31 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 238.
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Smith may even have drawn the title of his magnum opus from the title of his
mentor’s book. The full title of Smith’s most famous work is: An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). The full title of
Hutcheson’s magnum opus is: An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue (1725).
As mentioned earlier, Hutcheson was the most notable student of
Carmichael in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He then
succeeded Carmichael on the faculty at Glasgow. Carmichael’s convictions
were derived from the works of Grotius and Pufendorf, who built upon the
natural law tradition of Thomas Aquinas, and are responsible for Christianity’s
natural law tradition as applied to law and commerce. These predecessors of
Adam Smith constructed two pillars that are predicates for antitrust to make
sense. First, the law is to protect private property from theft and expropriation
because there is a divine mandate for individuals to be able to exclude others
from the use of their private property. Second, the law is to protect the market
exchange of private property rights because there is a divine basis for individ-
uals to engage in voluntary exchange of property.32
But, even with these two pillars in place, both Grotius and Pufendorf had
concerns about the prospect of monopoly in a market-based economy. The
views of Grotius on monopoly are expressed with examples of monopolizing
(or “engrossing”) agricultural products and the naval practices of the
Spaniards:
32 Pufendorf anticipated the State granting property rights to deter free riding on risky
investments. He wrote:
Besides, the Magistrate may give one Man, or one Company of Men the sole Power of
Importing certain Commodities from certain Places, exclusive of all others. And there
may be several good Reasons for the granting such a Privilege. For it requires vast
Charges to settle a Trade with a very remote Nation, and perhaps after great Expenses
it may not succeed at all; and therefore the Authors of such a Commerce ought in reason
to have Security, that others may not intercept gratis what they have established at their
great Risk and Charge; and besides such privileged Companies are better able to assist
the Public with their Riches; upon any Emergencies, than private Persons: By this means
too a greater Trade may be carried on, and with better Credit: Nor is this Method liable
to so many Tricks and Shifts, since the Gain comes into the common Bank to be divided
proportionally amongst them all. But as for these Privileges, a prudent Government will
not grant ‘em, but where the Commodities are imported from remote Places, and with
great Hazard; and which do not so much concern the Necessities as the Superfluities of
Life. Not even then must the Merchants be allowed to enhance the Price of those
Things at their Pleasure; for it is against Reason to give a few an opportunity of scraping
up exorbitant Riches out of the Fortunes of the rest, when the Public gets nothing by it.
(Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books, 1729. Book
V. Chapter V. Section VII).
Christianity and Antitrust 83
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108860932.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 02 Jul 2021 at 15:45:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
What, therefore, may seem so unjust as that the Spaniards should have the
whole world tributary, so that they neither buy nor sell but at their pleasure?
We hate and also punish engrossers of corn or other commodities in all cities.
Nor doth any trade of life seem so wicked and hateful as this engrossing of
corn. And that worthily too. For they do injury to nature which is plentiful
and liberal to all in common. Nor is it to be thought that negotiation was
found for a few men’s uses, but to the end that what was wanting unto one
should be recompensed through the plenty of another yet with a just advan-
tage or profit propounded unto all who should undertake the danger and
labor of transporting.33
Pufendorf expanded upon Grotius’ work,34 describing monopoly as contrary to
natural law. He did not mince words:
But a Monopoly, properly so called, as having the Force of Privilege, cannot
be set on foot by private Men: For how can a private Man justify his
hindering others from meddling with such a sort of Commodity, when he
has no Command over, nor can lawfully use Force against them? And
33 Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, trans. Hakluyt. 1609. Reprint (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund,
2004), p. 56.
34 Despite being extremely similar in ideology, Pufendorf did not always see eye to eye with
Grotius about monopoly. Grotius explains his justification of some natural monopoly
structures, incorporating a biblical reference, in this excerpt:
All Monopolies are not repugnant to the Law of Nature, for they may sometimes be
permitted by the Sovereign upon a just Cause, and at a certain Rate; as may appear from
the Example of Joseph, when he was Governor of Aegypt: So also under the Romans, the
Alexandrians had the Monopoly, as Strabo tells us, of all Commodities brought from the
Indies and Aethiopia. The like may be done by private Persons, provided they are
contented with a reasonable Profit. But they, who, as the Oylmen in the Velabrum, do
purposely combine to advance the Value of their Wares above the highest Degree of the
current Price, and those also who use Force or Fraud to prevent the Importation of any
greater Quantity, or else agree to buy up all, in Order to sell them again, at a Rate very
exorbitant, considering the Season, commit an Injustice, and are obliged to make
Amends and a Reparation for it. If indeed they do by any other Means hinder the
bringing in of Goods, or ingross them to themselves, to vend them dearer, tho’ at a Price
not unreasonable for the Season, they act against the Rules of Charity as St. Ambrose
proves by several Arguments, in his third Book of Offices, but properly speaking, they
violate no Man’s Right. (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 1625. Reprint
[Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005], vol. 2, chapter 12, section 16)
But Pufendorf disagrees with Grotius on the basis of Joseph’s lack of use of market power:
Grotius bring the Example of Joseph, when he was Viceroy of Egypt, in Justification of
Monopolies; tho’ that Example is not much to the Purpose: For neither did the King
hinder others from buying up the Corn in the Years of Plenty, nor any from selling, who
had too much: Neither had the Alexandrians in Strabo the Monopoly of Indian and
Ethiopian Commodities from any Privilege, but from the Situations of the Place. (von
Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations)
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therefore the Monopolies of private Men are spurious and illegal, and do not
depend upon Rights and Privileges, but are generally carried on by clandes-
tine Frauds and Combinations: As if some few by a Trick should debar others
from Trading to those Places from whence they have their Commodities, or
should hinder those that have them from bringing them to Market: Or, if
they should enter into a Combination to buy up all such sort of
Commodities, and then stifle them, that so the Scarcity may enhance the
Price. Against whom may be applied that of Apollonius Tyanaus in Philostr.
in the Beginning. ‘The Earth is the Mother of all, for she is just; but you
being unjust have made her only a Mother to your selves.’ The Knavery of
such ought as much to be corrected, as those who enter into Compact to
raise extravagantly the Prices of other things, by agreeing privately to sell
nothing under such a Rate: Which piece of Roguery Labourers and
Workmen are sometimes guilty of.35
In the quotation that follows, Pufendorf even anticipated Holmes’ dissent in
the Northern Pacific case.36
In this place something maybe expected to be said concerning Monopolies,
Whether any, or all of them be against the Law of Nature, or no? For ‘tis an
odious Name, and the Laws of many States brand it grievously. But here we
must exempt several Things from the insidious Title of Monopolies, which
indeed are not such. For sure ‘tis prohibited by no Law, nor can it come
under the Name of a Monopoly, if only one Man, in any Town, has got the
way of making some sort of Manufacture, or if one Man only has got such a
sort of Grain in his Ground, or if some certain Commodity be the Produce
only of one particular Country. Since there is no such ‘Produce of Alume in
any other Country, which yet is of great Use, it is not to be wondered at, that
the Lipareans have the Monopoly of it, and setting what Prices they please
upon it, make vast Returns.’ For Monopolies, as such, imply that others too
would sell the same, did not one Man ingross the whole Trade to himself.37
35 Ibid.
36 “The law, I repeat, says nothing about competition, and only prevents its suppression by
contracts or combinations in restraint of trade, and such contracts or combinations derive their
character as restraining trade from other features that the suppression of competition alone. To
see whether I am wrong, the illustrations put in the argument are of use. If I am, then a
partnership between two stage coach drivers who have been competitors in driving across a
state line, or two merchants once engaged in rival commerce among the States whether made
after or before the act, if now continued, is a crime. For, again I repeat, if the restraint on the
freedom of the members of a combination caused by their entering into a partnership is a
restraint of trade, every such combination, as well the small as the great, is within the act.”
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 410 (1904).
37 Pufendorf’s paradigm of natural law anticipates the common law on restraint of trade with
these words: “But if a Man, without contracting with the Others, should of his own Head aim
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Gregg summarizes the Grotius-Pufendorf intersection this way:
Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1609) . . . made a powerful case for the liberty of all
people of all nations to use the sea to trade freely (1609, 2004, pp. 49–51) and
is commonly regarded as one of the first early-modern arguments against
monopolies.
Widely regarded as one of Grotius’s most prominent intellectual disciples,
a considerable portion of Pufendorf’s theological and jurisprudential writings
were concerned with applying Grotius’s schema to a range of then-
contemporary issues . . . [for example] when it came to the question of
economic value and price, Pufendorf argued that the determining factors
were a good’s relative scarcity and its subjective utility.
(Pufendorf, 1673, 2004, pp. 140–145)38
With Grotius and Pufendorf as the foundation, let’s return to how Carmichael
built upon it. He wrote this about competition:
[The] further expenditure of labour and industry which the interest of
human society requires in the way of competition in cultivating the things
of the earth, is likely to achieve a greater stock of a certain kind of thing than
our own personal use requires. In return for these we can acquire, by the use
of agreements, other things that are useful to us. This further fruit of our
labour should not be taken from us, provided we got it without fraudulent
and unfair oppression of others, who should always be left the opportunity to
get what their own use requires under fair conditions.39
Gregg summarizes the importance of Carmichael on competition this way:
Carmichael highlights the importance of competition in stimulating the
human creativity that delivers a surplus of privately-owned goods that people
can then trade via voluntary transactions, while simultaneously insisting that
others should have the opportunity to enter the circle of exchange. The
implication is that it is unjust and not in the interests of the common good to
unreasonably restrict market exchange. This amounts to a Christian natural-
law argument for the moral necessity of free trade – an argument that would
have resonated throughout much of the Scotland of Carmichael’s time.40
at a Monopoly, by hindering some by Force, and others by clandestine Contrivances, from
coming to the same Place, and by that means lay a Necessity upon all others to buy of him, it is
plain that he offends against the Law of Humanity, and impudently breaks in upon the Liberty
of the rest.” von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations.
38 Gregg, “Commercial Order and the Scottish Enlightenment,” p. 48.
39 Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment, eds.
James Monroe and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), p. 95.
40 Gregg, “Commercial Order and the Scottish Enlightenment,” p. 50.
86 Kenneth G. Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108860932.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 02 Jul 2021 at 15:45:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
These words resonate “throughout much of the antitrust community of today”
because Carmichael understood that competition was better than planning,
that private property was a prerequisite of competition, that competition
produced a “surplus” (or economic growth), that competition should not be
to the benefit of some but not others, that competition should not be unrea-
sonably restricted, and that there was a biblical basis for competition being
given free reign. As Gregg summarized the linkage from Grotius and
Pufendorf to Carmichael to Smith,
Perhaps Gershom Carmichael’s greatest contribution to the Scottish
Enlightenment was to re-introduce the natural-law tradition, long dormant
in Scotland since the Reformation, back into Scottish learning. While figures
such as Hume reflected upon commercial society’s emergence in ways that
marked a break with Christian belief about human nature, most Scottish
Enlightenment scholars – including, to a certain extent, Adam Smith,
engaged in the same enterprise primarily within the context of the powerful
theological and philosophical legacy bequeathed by the 17th century
Protestant natural law tradition associated with figures such as Hugh
Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94).41
The encomium Smith gives to “Presbyterian clergy” is, at its taproot, recogni-
tion of a theory of law and commerce that was put forth by scholar-pastors who
applied reason to Scripture. The result was a “natural law” that – like antitrust
law – is friendly to market exchange, not hostile to it.42
Later scholars had no qualms about connecting Adam Smith’s invisible
hand to a providential order. Richard Whately wrote, “Man is, in the same act,
doing one thing, by choice, for his own benefit, and another, undesignedly,
under the care of Providence, for the service of the community.”43 In writing
these words, Whately was influenced by Smith.44 Thomas Chalmers rewrote
the principle of the invisible hand this way:
The greatest economic good is rendered to the community by each man
being left to consult and to labour for his own particular good – or, in other
words, a more prosperous result is obtained by the spontaneous play and busy
41 Ibid., p. 47.
42 Gregg contends that in Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy, the author further developed
“economic ideas found in Grotius and Pufendorf, mediated through Carmichael, many of
which anticipate theories subsequently developed in Smith’s The Wealth of Nations”
(1776, 1904).
43 Richard Whately, Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (London: B. Fellowes, 1832),
p. 103.
44 Elizabeth Jane Whately, Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, DD. (London:
Longmans, Green, 1866).
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competition of many thousand wills, each bent on the prosecution of its own
selfishness, than by the anxious superintendence of a government, vainly
attempting to medicate the fancied imperfections of nature.45
In the ability of markets to translate the self-interest of economic agents into
the good of others, Chalmers claimed this “bespeaks a higher Agent, by whose
transcendental wisdom it is, that all is made to conspire so harmoniously, and
to terminate beneficially.”46 If Providence has ordained that consumers appeal
to the self-interest of sellers, who then compete in the marketplace for
consumer patronage, any agent that eliminates competition, or suppresses it
through regulation, squelches this “transcendental wisdom.” This means that
any institution that preserves and promotes market competition is an agent of
Providence. Central planners search for proper levers of government regula-
tion to allocate society’s scarce resources. The default position of antitrust is to
search for a market-based solution to allocate society’s scarce resources.
Grotius, Pufendorf, and their progeny presumably applaud antitrust from
the heavenly sidelines.
Modern theorists often justify antitrust law in purely consequentialist terms.
For example, Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading antitrust scholar and custodian
of the highly influential Areeda-Turner treatise, asserts that antitrust law has
“no moral content.”47 But the story of antitrust is not one of legal doctrine
shorn of natural law.48 The natural law that informed Adam Smith – the
natural law two pillars are private property and voluntary exchange – remains
fundamental to the institution of antitrust. Indeed, the institution of antitrust
has no basis apart from a certain – if we may use the word – “reverence” for
private property and voluntary exchange.
Joseph Schumpeter, in his classic History of Economic Analysis, claimed
that economics, as a discipline, “gained definite if not separate existence” by
45 Thomas Chalmers, On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God (London: Bell and Daldy,
1869), p. 238.
46 Ibid., p. 239.
47 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets,” Journal of Corporation Law,
vol. 28 (2003), pp. 607, 609; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle
and Execution (2005), pp. 10, 54 (stating that antitrust is only concerned with the economic, not
the moral, implications of conduct).
48 Alvey offers two reasons why economics is, today, largely shorn of “moral concerns.” “First, the
natural sciences came to be seen as successful, and the attempt was made to emulate that
success in economics by applying natural science methods, including mathematics, to
economic phenomena. Second, the self-styled economic science came to adopt positivism,
which ruled out moral issues from science itself.” James E. Alvey, “A Short History of
Economics as a Moral Science,” Journal of Markets and Morality, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1999),
pp. 53–73.
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way of Christianity’s influence on law.49 Jacob Viner, another historian of
economic thought who paralleled Schumpeter in stature, wrote: “I am
obliged to insist that Adam Smith’s system of thought, including his econom-
ics, is not intelligible if one disregards the role he assigns in it to the teleo-
logical elements.”50
4.3 antitrust themes: rationality, equity, efficiency,
competition, innovation
4.3.1 Antitrust and Rationality
The first thematic connection between antitrust and the Christian faith is
theological: From whence cometh the basis for the institution of antitrust?
The Christian faith offers a foundation for the same rationality upon which
antitrust enforcement is founded.51 In his book, The Victory of Reason, Rodney
Stark explains:
The Christian image of God is that of a rational being who believes in
human progress, more fully revealing himself as humans gain the capacity
to better understand. Moreover, because God is a rational being and the
universe is his personal creation, it necessarily has a rational, lawful, stable
structure, awaiting increased human comprehension.52
After creating “male and female” in his own image, “God blessed them and
said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue
it . . .’”53 In what has come to be called the creation mandate, God directs men
and women to be His stewards over the earth. This means that human beings –
unlike all other living creatures – have been given a form of dominion over
49 “It is within [the scholastics’] systems of moral theology and law that economics gained a
definite if not separate existence, and it is they who come nearer than does any other group to
having been the ‘founders’ of scientific economics.” Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 97.
50 Jacob Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order (Philadelphia, PA: American
Philosophical Society, 1972), pp. 81–82.
51 This is a very different topic than the familiar terrain, already explored, of the basis of antitrust
in English common law or the legislative history of antitrust law. See William Letwin, “The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 21,
no. 3 (1954), p. 355; and Donald Dewey,Monopoly in Economics and Law (Chicago, IL: Rand
McNally and Company, 1959), especially chapters IX and X; and Hans Thorelli, The Federal
Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).
52 Rodney Stark, The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and
Western Success (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 11–12.
53 Genesis 1:27–28.
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God’s creation, not out of merit, but rather because God was pleased to create
them in His image. Man is able to exercise good stewardship over the earth
because God, as Stark describes it, created the earth as a “rational, lawful,
stable structure, awaiting increased human comprehension.” As the field of
antitrust has grown in its “human comprehension,” antitrust is better pos-
itioned to “subdue the earth” to the extent it applies a “rational, lawful, stable
structure” to the task of stewardship that the Bible claims God ceded to
mankind.54 The rationality postulate undergirds most of economic analysis.
A presupposition of antitrust is that the rational economic actor model
applies to both buyer and seller. Where antitrust economics stands in tension
with the Christian faith is where Christianity also sees men and women as
sinners, in need of redemption offered in the Gospel through Jesus Christ.
Whereas antitrust seeks to optimize the choice set that consumers face,
Christianity questions some of the choices that buyers and sellers make.
Consumer preferences, to be met by competing sellers at congenial prices,
are not a necessary or sufficient condition for human flourishing.
Describing economic agents through the lens of Christian theology,
Brennan and Waterman explain:
Their desires do not reflect their true interest. Their actual behavior has no
presumptive normative authority. Man is sinful. Agents know what they
ought to do, but they do something else . . . As St Paul puts it: “That which
I would not, that I do. And that which I would, I do not.”55
Thus, while antitrust seeks the optimization of consumer choices,56
Christianity questions the morality of those choices. Paul’s writings in
Romans 7:15, referenced above, describe the insufficiency of consumer choice
alone for human flourishing. However, as we’ve argued in this section, the
fundamental rationality necessitated by antitrust’s rational actor model
54 Pufendorf described the creation mandate this way: “For, not being born for himself alone, but
being therefore furnished with so many excellent Endowments, that he may set forth his
Creator’s Praise, and be rendered a fit Member of Human Society; it follows hence, that it is his
Duty, to cultivate and improve those Gifts of his Creator which he finds in himself, that they
may answer the End of their Donor; and to contribute all that lies in his Power to the Benefit of
Human Society.” Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of
Nature, 1673. Reprint (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2003).
55 Geoffrey Brennan and Anthony M. C. Waterman, “Christian Theology and Economics:
Convergence and Clashes,” in Christian Theology and Market Economics, eds. Ian R. Harper
and Samuel Gregg (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 91.
56 Economics as a science lacks the language to create “moral norms,” but rather the moral
concerns of individuals within the context of Pareto efficiency, which analyzes individuals’
preferences as data apart from value judgments. While economic theory provides no basis for
value judgments, Christianity stands ready to fill the gap.
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coincides with the biblical mandate to “subdue the earth” along with the
biblical description of God as a rational, ordered being.
4.3.2 Equity and Efficiency57
The pursuit of equity and efficiency provide us with an additional intersection
between Christianity and the institution of antitrust. Throughout the biblical
narrative, the revealed nature of God is one of equity and justice.58 In the
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus even blesses the materially poor.59 Additionally,
the Bible upholds the wise allocation of resources in an efficient manner.60
The goal of antitrust squares with the biblical values of both equity
and efficiency.
In his Godkin lecture, Arther Okun claimed: “We can’t have our cake of
market efficiency and share it equally.”61 The conventional wisdom is that
there is a trade-off between the pursuit of efficiency and the pursuit of income
equality.62 True, the operating assumption of most economic analyses is to
hold the distribution of income constant (or assume it as given) and, from that,
to analyze efficiency problems. But no one seriously entertains the notion that
some distributions of income, because of their structure of incentives and
rewards, will not yield a larger basket of output than others.
In light of this trade-off, it is notable that antitrust enforcement generally
serves to help those at the low end of the income distribution range without
decreasing economic efficiency. Antitrust achieves this double benefit when it
promotes efficiency in resource allocation by preventing the cartelization or
monopolization of markets patronized by low-income consumers. The eco-
nomic logic is straightforward: Prices will be made lower in a competitive
market so that for any given income, a larger basket of goods and services can
be purchased. Antitrust policy, therefore, need not concern itself with increas-
ing the purchasing power of the poor because it does this when it thwarts
cartels and monopolies in its pursuit of economic efficiency.
57 This section draws upon Kenneth Elzinga, “Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and
Efficiency, What Else Counts?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 125, no. 6 (1977),
pp. 1191–1213.
58 Psalm 99:4; Proverbs 1:3.
59 Luke 6:20.
60 Proverbs 31:27; Psalm 90:12; Proverbs 21:5; Psalm 39:4–5.
61 Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency, the Big Tradeoff (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1975).
62 C. Brehm and T. Saving, “The Demand for General Assistance Payments,” American
Economic Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (1964), pp. 1002–1018.
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Antitrust actions may not always improve both income distribution and
efficiency. For example, the breakup of a cartel of artist-merchants who
handcraft porcelain will be efficient but will bestow its distributional benefits
only upon the economically privileged who shop in this market, thus arguably
increasing inequality. But such situations are not the norm – in most circum-
stances antitrust gives the efficiency–equality trade-off the characteristic of
having one’s cake and eating it too. While a direct assault on inequality
through income redistribution might lead to a reduction in efficiency, a direct
assault on inefficiency through antitrust will not necessarily result in any
reduction in equality.
In sum, the pursuit of efficiency goals through antitrust enforcement is
consistent with the objective of equitable distribution of income.63 This is not
to say that antitrust policy alone is a sufficient redistributive tool. Most analyses
of the poverty problem in the United States attach only minimal importance
to inadequate antitrust enforcement as a causative agent. The problem of
poverty is attributed more often to the low level of education and job skills of
the poor, insufficient aggregate demand, the distorted incentives of current
welfare policies, drug addiction and alcoholism, racial discrimination, and a
cognitive bias in favor of short-term over long-term satisfaction.64 Thus, the
pursuit of egalitarian income distribution through antitrust enforcement is
likely to have limited results.65 Nonetheless, the congenial quality about
antitrust is that the equity objectives that bear on its enforcement do not
seriously conflict, and at times even harmonize, with the pursuit of
economic efficiency.
63 Private recovery of treble damages, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1970), also has an apparent connection with
this equity goal of antitrust. Not only is it supposed to promote equity by compensating the
injured from the fruits of an antitrust violation, but it also reduces income inequality if we
make the assumption that those who commit violations generally have higher incomes than
those they injure.
64 See Robert J. Lampman, “Approaches to the Reduction of Poverty,” American Economic
Review, vol. 55, no. 1 (1965), pp. 521, 524–525. See generally Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly
City (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1970).
65 In fact, antitrust pursuit of equity goals is foreclosed in some areas. For example, those
“restraints of trade” effected by labor unions and minimum wage laws directly contribute to
income maldistribution, but, with only a few exceptions, antitrust is unable to strike at labor
market restraints. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310U.S. 469 (1940), the Sherman Act was held
not to apply to “restraints on the sale of the employee’s services to the employer.” Ibid., 503. See
also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The broad union exemption under Apex
Hosiery was narrowed in Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975). Antitrust also has made important inroads on restraints upon competition by
professional associations. For example, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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4.3.3 The Morality of Competition
Antitrust policy is predicated on the assumption that business firms will
create public benefits when they compete hard against one another by
improving products and offering lower prices, or what Scherer and Ross
describe as “conscious[ly] striving against other business firms for
patronage . . . for potentially incompatible positions.”66 Christian thinkers
continue to debate competition as a matter of Christian ethics and moral-
ity.67 One can debate, for example, how Jesus’ admonition to turn the other
cheek68 and Paul’s admonition to train ourselves like competitive athletes
and run the competitive race before us69 inform Christian ethics in
the marketplace.
There are several ways to reconcile these ostensible (and, we believe, only
ostensible) conflicts in Scripture. Competition as an industrial value need not
imply a society organized on selfish and ruthless disregard of others, or what
C. S. Lewis gives as the state of hell: “A state in which everyone is perpetually
concerned about his own dignity and advancement . . . where everyone lives
the deadly serious passions of envy, self-importance, and resentment.”70 To
the contrary, competition can be salutary for society and for the individual
competitor.
First, antitrust policy is focused on a systemic rather than personal level, and
as such, it is designed to advance social welfare. On average, what producers
lose through competition is more than made up for by consumers’ gains.71
Thus, an antitrust policy mandating competition rather than cooperation is
not designed to enrich some at the expense of others, but rather to confer
public benefits. The public benefits of market interactions may be seen as the
sum of the mutual benefits gained by individuals in Smith’s “obvious and
simple system of natural liberty.” Bruni and Sugden (2013) argue that mutual
benefit is not only a fortunate by-product of the pursuit of self-interest, but
actually the telos of the market: that buyers and sellers in a competitive
66 F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Dallas,
TX: Houghton Mifflin, 1990).
67 Clive Breed has assembled recent literature in “Jesus and Competition,” Faith & Economics,
vol. 45, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 41–57.
68 Matthew 5:39.
69 Hebrews 12:1–2; I Corinthians 9:27.
70 C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942), p. vii.
71 Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 110.
Christianity and Antitrust 93
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108860932.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 02 Jul 2021 at 15:45:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
marketplace actually intend for mutually beneficial transactions.72 Thus, in
preserving competition among producers, antitrust enables the marketplace to
flourish in the mutually beneficial manner that an economy of central
planning or rent-seeking does not produce. As Paul Rubin has argued, market
competition is a form of unplanned cooperation to secure systemic economic
benefits.73
Even at a personal level, competition within ethical and legal boundaries
can be considered salutary for all involved. Shane Clifton argues from the
Pentecostal tradition that “[c]ompetition is not a way for the powerful to crush
the powerless, but for each person to reach their potential.”74 In the same way
that an athlete running her hardest may hope to spur on her rivals to better
performances, the Christian in business who competes hard for business need
not wish her rival to perish, but may indeed hope that her competition spurs
other firms to improvement. As Judge Learned Hand recognized in the Alcoa
case, “Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from
competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that
the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition
to let well enough alone.”75
Finally, although antitrust law requires competition, it also establishes
limits on competition (i.e., prohibiting predatory or anticompetitive tactics),
as do separate strands of law, particularly contracts, torts, intellectual property,
and the law of unfair competition. Thus, the competition that antitrust law
mandates is not cutthroat or unlimited, but bounded by legal principles
grounded in ethics and morality.
4.3.4 Innovation
Among contemporary economists, there is widespread agreement that market
systems promote innovation. There is considerably less agreement on whether
antitrust enforcement promotes for innovation, or whether it instead gets in
72 Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden, “Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 4 (2013), pp. 141–164.
73 Paul H. Rubin, “Emporiophobia (Fear of Markets): Cooperation or Competition?,” Southern
Economic Journal, vol. 80, no. 4 (2013), pp. 875–889.
74 Shane Clifton, “Pentecostal Approaches to Economics,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Christianity and Economics, ed. Rachel M. McCleary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),
p. 275.
75 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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the way. This debate is often styled as the Schumpeter–Arrow divide,
following the work of the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter and the
American Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow,76 and has taken a prominent place
in recent antitrust enforcement actions in high-tech industries, such as those
concerning Microsoft, Google, and Intel. We do not propose to resolve the
Schumpeter–Arrow divide here but rather offer more general comments on
the value of economic innovation from a biblical perspective.
As mentioned earlier, faulty narratives often have portrayed Christianity as
historically antagonistic to innovation. But both Christian theology as well as
Church history are positively disposed to innovation.77 A thorough historical
analysis demonstrates the connection between Christian movements and
innovation. Rodney Stark has argued that Christianity, by focusing on theo-
logical abstraction and rationality and recognizing property rights, became a
catalyst for technological and scientific innovation throughout Western
Europe.78 Joel Mokyr has disputed what he views as Stark’s “argument based
on some inherent superiority of Western or Christian culture” in advancing
innovation, but does credit the Puritan embrace of science as a driving force
behind the British Industrial Revolution.79
In the antitrust pursuit to “depart from laissez faire in the ultimate interests
of laissez faire,”80 the antitrust institution seeks to promote competitive pro-
cesses that enable and incentivize innovation. This goal of promoting indus-
trial innovation and progress finds ample support within a long-standing
Christian tradition. Although Christian theology has relatively little to offer
informing precisely how antitrust should spur innovation – whether by inter-
vening aggressively to correct market failures or staying its hand out of
solicitude for experimentation and robust competition – the Christian trad-
ition strongly supports innovation as a goal.
76 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Competition and Innovation,” in The Making of Competition Policy:
Legal and Economic Sources, eds. Daniel Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
77 Anne Bradley catalogues the relationship between Christianity and Innovation in her article
“Innovation, Change, and Economic Growth: A Christian Economist’s Perspective,” Institute
for Faith, Work and Economics, March 11, 2013, https://tifwe.org/innovation-change-economic-
growth-a-christian-economists-perspective/. She writes that the Bible documents and upholds
innovation in the forms of Construction (Genesis 6:14; 1 Kings 5–6), Metallurgy (Proverbs 25:4;
Zechariah 13:9; Isaiah 48:10), Clothing (Genesis 37), and Shipping (James 3:4; John 21:11).
78 Stark, The Victory of Reason.
79 Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 229, 314.
80 Joel B. Dirlam and Alfred E. Kahn, Fair Competition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1954), p. 17.
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4.4 application to selected domains of antitrust law
4.4.1 The Bible and Cartels81
The quotation from Adam Smith that most antitrust lawyers know (particu-
larly members of the plaintiffs’ bar) is: “People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”82
Because price-fixing and other forms of cartel conduct occupy center stage
in US antitrust enforcement, if there is any connection between the Christian
faith and antitrust, it should show up here. And it does.
Suppose that a group of firms becomes weary of competing against each
other so they divide up the market geographically, each firm agreeing not to
poach on customers outside its designated territory. Or a group of sellers
become unhappy with prevailing prices so they agree to a floor price below
which sales will not be made. Or consider a market where prices are deter-
mined by competitive bidding, but sellers meet in advance in order to rig bid
prices. Economists recognize each of these collective strategies as a variation
of cartel behavior. Antitrust lawyers recognize each as being illegal per se
under federal antitrust laws. The Bible, in turn, recognizes such concerted
conduct as immoral.
The ninth commandment prohibits bearing false witness.83 This amounts
to a condemnation of the deceptive nature of cartels as a matter of Christian
morality. When a company holds itself out to its customers as an independent
center of initiative in the marketplace, yet buyers are uninformed that the
market has been parceled out, or that a floor price has been set, or that the
bidding is phony, the firms in the cartel have borne false witness. Indeed,
many cartel agreements involve the submission of bogus bids or other forms of
dissimulation to prevent buyers from detecting the fact that quoted prices have
been fabricated through collusion. Antitrust laws that deter cartels deter the
bearing of false witness.
The ninth commandment, in its brevity, makes no distinction between
white lies and major falsehoods. In like fashion, Section One of the Sherman
Act draws no distinction as to whether the cartel raises prices and restricts
81 This section draws upon Kenneth G. Elzinga, “Controversy: Are Antitrust Laws Immoral?
A Response to Jeffrey Tucker,” Journal of Markets and Morality, vol. 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 83–89.
82 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan
(Indianapolis, IN: Library of Economics and Liberty, 1904), p. 137.
83 Deuteronomy 5:20.
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output by large amounts or small. Participants in a cartel bear false witness
whether the cartel is weak or strong.
Any decision by prospective members to form a cartel involves the calcula-
tion of prospective costs and benefits. Absent antitrust deterrence, the major
economic hindrances to cartelization would be the free rider problem,
cheating by members of the cartel, and fending off prospective new entrants.
Absent antitrust deterrence against cartels, one of the major moral deterrences
to cartelization would be any unwillingness on the part of sellers to portray
themselves as independent economic agents – when they are not. Ceteris
paribus, economics teaches that without antitrust deterrence, there will be
more cartels. Antitrust is a concession to the inability of the ninth command-
ment to thwart cartels fully.
When the Justice Department announces a criminal enforcement action
against companies or individuals involved in cartel agreements, it often issues
a press release equating the price-fixing agreement to a form of theft from
consumers. While we have no quarrel with that characterization, we would
suggest that the Christian tradition emphasizes an additional evil of the cartel
agreement – its inability to operate without a high degree of dishonesty and
deception.84
4.4.2 The Bible and Mergers
If cartels are the meat and potatoes of antitrust enforcement, mergers and
acquisitions are the soup and salad courses. Does the Christian faith offer a
perspective on anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions as it does cartel
conduct? Indirectly, yes.
A merger to monopoly may restrict output and raise prices (just as a cartel
will do). Whether one considers these effects immoral depends upon whether
one considers sellers extracting wealth from consumers by output restriction –
rather than by superior skill, foresight, and industry – to be immoral.
The Scriptures are favorably disposed to the pursuit of profits when it entails
good stewardship over society’s scarce resources, honesty in one’s dealings,
and honoring God by giving Him the first fruits of the return.85 Economic
theory teaches that monopolistic output restriction is inefficient. Inefficiency
84 Jonathan Crowe and Barbara Jedlickova describe the wrongness of cartels as pertaining to both
the negative economic consequences of cartels to the competitive marketplace as well as the
immorality of deception, which reflects the analysis in our chapter of cartels violating both
economic and moral rules. Jonathan Crowe and Barbara Jedlickova, “What’s Wrong with
Cartels,” Federal Law Review, vol. 44 (2016), pp. 401–418.
85 Proverbs 3:9–10.
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in a world of scarcity may itself be immoral from the standpoint of the biblical
principle of stewardship.86
A business community that outwardly prides itself on the virtues of free
enterprise, but engages in extensive horizontal integration that eliminates
competing sources of supply, can hardly expect to persuade customers of the
merits or the morality of free enterprise. For consumers, free enterprise
connotes not only freedom of contract between buyers and sellers but also
the freedom for buyers to shop among alternative sources of supply. At the
taproot, that is what the antimerger law seeks to accomplish.
In a fallen world, many questions are hard to answer. Even antitrust experts
often disagree on the merits of a particular merger. In the case of horizontal
mergers, the combining firms may secure market power that will harm
consumers or exploit economic efficiencies that will benefit consumers. The
market may discipline a combination of business firms that, hindsight reveals,
made no economic sense. It is sometimes tricky to sort mergers into competi-
tive and anticompetitive categories. Should we, for that reason, give all
corporate marriages a pass so long as all the firms come to the altar willingly?
It is an act of faith (in markets, not the Scriptures) to believe we can dispose of
antitrust in the merger arena just because antitrust authorities may sometimes
stop benign or efficient mergers or neglect to unravel anticompetitive mergers.
4.4.3 The Bible and Economic Dominance
The third major heading of contemporary antitrust law is monopolization, or
what the Europeans call “abuse of dominance.” Monopolization remains a
poorly defined antitrust offense, with significant ongoing policy contestation
around such questions as whether dominant firms should be subject to special
obligations to avoid perpetuating their dominance and where the line should
be drawn between aggressive but permissible competitive behavior and unlaw-
fully predatory behavior. Antitrust practitioners agree that the proverbial act of
blowing up the competitor’s factory should be considered monopolization,
but consensus beyond that is scarce.
The Scriptures contain no secret code on how to write contemporary
monopolization law, but they do provide ethical principles regarding the
accumulation of earthly riches. On the one hand, the Scriptures are replete
with warnings to the wealthy and powerful. For example, I Timothy 6:9–10
warns that the love of money is the root of all sorts of evil. And, in Luke 6:24,
86 See also Proverbs 31:18; Luke 19:13.
98 Kenneth G. Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108860932.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 02 Jul 2021 at 15:45:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
Jesus pronounces a woe to the rich, who have already received their consola-
tion. But Jesus’ parables also underscore the virtue of prudent investment,
including reaping just rewards for risk-taking. In the Parable of the Bags of
Gold,87 Jesus hypothesizes an employer who entrusts bags of gold – five, two,
or one – to three servants while he’s away on a journey. Upon his return, he
learns that the servants with five or two bags made prudent investments during
his absence, each doubling the master’s principal, but that the third servant,
entrusted with a single gold bag, hid it in the ground and therefore earned no
return on investment. This servant attempts to justify himself on the basis that,
knowing his master was a hard man, he ensured the safety of the money
entrusted. His master rebuffs this excuse, pointing out that even a very safe
investment with bankers would have garnered some interest, and has the
“wicked and lazy” servant punished.
Although Jesus meant this parable to have a primarily spiritual connotation
regarding the Kingdom of God, its economic moral buttresses a strand of
monopolization jurisprudence holding that firms should not be penalized for
reaping the benefits of their risky investments and that less efficient firms should
not have standing to complain when their more efficient rivals grow market
share: “For whoever has will be given more, and they will have an abundance.
Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them.”88
4.5 conclusion
Geoffrey Brennan and Anthony Waterman make this statement about
economics:
Economists have long paid lip service to the idea of economics as a pure
science that cannot authorize them to offer “a single syllable of advice.”
[quoting Nassau Senior] But in practice, they have rarely been able to resist
making policy recommendations of all sorts – recommendations that neces-
sarily commit them to underlying normative foundations. As one influential
moral philosopher has put it, thinking of economics as it is actually practiced,
“economics is a branch of ethics . . . (quoting Broome).”89
Our analysis of the intersection of antitrust and Christianity runs parallel to
that of Brennan and Waterman. While antitrust is about law and economics,
antitrust is also about ethics. And the ethics of antitrust can be viewed
87 Matthew 25:14–29.
88 Matthew 25:29.
89 Brennan and Waterman, “Christian Theology and Economics,” p. 86.
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profitably (no pun intended) through the lens of the Christian faith. Indeed,
the institution of antitrust connects with the Christian faith in several ways.
The historical foundation of antitrust finds its roots in the Christian thinkers of
the Scholastic tradition, the Reformation movement, and the Scottish
Enlightenment. Adam Smith, the patron saint of economics, was himself
influenced by the Presbyterian clergymen of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Smith’s “simple and obvious system of natural liberty” has been codified with
the most famous metaphor in all of the social sciences: the invisible hand. It is
this “simple and obvious system of natural liberty” – Smith’s invisible hand –
which modern antitrust endeavors to protect and promote.90
The themes of antitrust, such as rationality, equity, efficiency, competition,
and innovation, are all congruent with biblical foundations and Christian
principles. This chapter also explores a triad of contemporary applications of
Christian thinking and antitrust litigation: cartelization, mergers, and eco-
nomic dominance. Overall, we illustrate the deep interconnectedness – his-
torically, thematically, and contemporarily – of the Christian faith with
antitrust as a discipline.
90 Adam Smith’s less well-known The Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a bridge
between the Christian ethics of Hutcheson and the secular ethics of Hume. The many
attempts to exegete what the discipline of economics means by the pursuit of self-interest is
derivative of Smith’s endeavor to mediate between Hume’s dismissal of a supernaturally
grounded basis for ethics and Hutcheson’s insistence on a revelation revealed basis
for morality.
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